Populist Diplomacy and the Transition from Law-Making Treaties to Contractual Treaties
Keywords:
Populist diplomacy , Law-Making Treaties, Contractual Treaties, International LawAbstract
A growing apprehension towards economic globalisation, international institutions, and constraints on sovereign political authority has accompanied the rise of populist diplomacy. By linking domestic anti-establishment sentiment with sovereignty-centred narratives, populist diplomacy often frames multilateral legal commitments and international institutions as constraints on national political choice. This research paper examines how this type of engagement affects treaty-making and institutional structures, with particular reference to the United Nations (UN) Charter, World Trade Organisation (WTO) agreements, the Rome Statute, and other major human rights and environmental regimes. This paper argues that the legal practices associated with populist diplomacy, which include contestation against international institutions, selective cooperation, withdrawal strategies and preferences for flexible arrangements, are not inherently populist. Instead, the significance of populist diplomacy is elucidated by the way in which these legal practices are configured and justified as part of a broader sovereignty-centred challenge to international legal authority. Against this backdrop, this research paper examines the appeal of contractual forms of cooperation as an alternative to institutionalised forms of cooperation; in that states retain greater control, flexibility, and reversibility. The argument put forward is not that contractual arrangements are inherently populist, but rather that their use as alternatives to more institutionalised forms of cooperation may reinforce existing pressures towards fragmentation within the international legal order. The paper concludes that the challenge posed by populist diplomacy goes beyond withdrawal from formal treaties; contributing to the gradual weakening and contestation of the institutions and interpretive processes that give international legal commitments their practical effect.
References
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104. Formally, the WTO operates on a ‘one country, one vote’ basis and by consensus (Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (n 2) art IX), but in practice, decision-making is shaped by informal influence and negotiation control by major economies. By contrast, the IMF and World Bank embed inequality in their constitutive texts, with voting power weighted to members’ financial quotas or shareholding (Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (n 102) art XII(5); Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (n 102) art V(3)).
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107. Shen and Shang (n 82).
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109. Lucas Knotter, ‘Contested Statehood in a Contested International Order: Furthering a Research Agenda’ (2024) 4(2) Global Studies Quarterly ksae040.
110. Catherine M Brölmann, ‘Law-Making Treaties: Form and Function in International Law’ (2005) 74 Nordic Journal of International Law 1.
111. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331, art 2(1)(a).
112. G Fitzmaurice, Second Report on the Law of Treaties (International Law Commission, 1957) UN Doc A/CN.4/107, in Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1957, vol II, 54 legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_107.pdf
113. Brölmann (n 110).
114. Catherine M Brölmann, The Institutional Veil in Public International Law: International Organisations and the Law of Treaties (Hart Publishing 2007) 115.
115. Brölmann (n 110) 4-5.
116. UN Charter (n 1).
117. Ibid arts 1 and 2.
118. Ibid art 103.
119. Ibid art 2(6).
120. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171.
121. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (adopted 18 December 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981) 1249 UNTS 13.
122. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 3, arts 5–8.
123. Marrakesh Agreement (n 2); Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (Annex 2 to the Marrakesh Agreement) art 17.
124. Brölmann (n 114); Alain Pellet, ‘Comments on the Law of Treaties’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford University Press 2013).
125. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 36 (2018) on Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on the Right to Life, UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/36, https://www.ohchr.org/en/calls-for-input/general-comment-no-36-article-6-right-life.
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127. Krieger (n 28) 9, 26.
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134. NDC Partnership, ‘Brazil’ (NDC Partnership) https://ndcpartnership.org/country/bra.
135. United Nations Climate Change, ‘UN Climate Change Conference – Belém, November 2025 (COP30)’ (22 November 2025) https://unfccc.int/cop30.
136. Climate Action Tracker, ‘CAT Climate Target Update Tracker: Brazil’ (9 December 2020) https://climateactiontracker.org/climate-target-update-tracker/brazil/; WWF-Brazil, ‘New Brazilian NDC Reduces the Country’s Climate Ambition, Against the Spirit of the Paris Agreement’ (11 December 2020) https://wwf.panda.org/wwf_news/?1173241/WWF-Brazil-NDC .
137. Marília Closs, ‘A Transforming Global Order, Geopolitical Turbulence and Climate Change: Challenges and Possibilities for Brazilian Foreign Policy’ in Maiara Folly, Marília Closs and Vitória Gonza (eds), Brazilian Foreign Policy and Climate: Towards an Environmentally Responsible and Socially Just Brazil (Brasília 2024) 42.
138. Jessica Diano and Mathilde Wieland Thorsen, Sovereignty, Security and Deforestation: A Literature Review on Narratives on Sovereignty in the Brazilian Deforestation Debate (Roskilde University 2023) https://rucforsk.ruc.dk/ws/files/66429853/Perspectives_Project___Jessica_and_Mathilde.pdf; Carla Jiménez, ‘Bolsonaro Fala em Mais Negócios com China e Rebate Críticas Sobre Amazônia: “Ela é Nossa, Não de Vocês”’ (El País, 19 July 2019) https://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2019/07/19/politica/1563564011_297794.html.
139. The Guardian, ‘Hungary to Pull Out of “Political” ICC as Netanyahu Visits Budapest’ (The Guardian, 3 April 2025) https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/apr/03/hungary-to-pull-out-of-icc-as-netanyahu-visits-hungary.
140. Situation in the State of Palestine, ‘Finding under article 87(7) of the Statute on Hungary’s non-compliance with the Court’s request to cooperate in the provisional arrest of Benjamin Netanyahu and referral to the Assembly of States Parties’ (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 24 July 2025) ICC-01/18-462, para 26.
141. Lehoczki (n 61).
142. The Guardian (n 139).
143. Eiran, Ish-Shalom and Kornprobst (n 5).
144. Karen Lema and Neil Jerome Morales, ‘Duterte to Withdraw Philippines from ICC after “Outrageous Attacks”’ (Reuters, 15 March 2018) reuters.com/article/world/duterte-to-withdraw-philippines-from-icc-after-outrageous-attacks-idUSKCN1GQ0M8/.
145. Rome Statute (n 122) art 127(1).
146. Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities (2018) (5 December 2018) 15–16.
147. Jiang Zhifeng, ‘Pacta Sunt Servanda and Empire: A Critical Examination of the Evolution, Invocation, and Application of an International Law Axiom’ (2022) 43 Michigan Journal of International Law 745.
148. International Law Commission, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-Fourth Session (29 April–7 June and 22 July–16 August 2002) UN Doc A/57/10, paras 492–494.
149. International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law UN Doc A/CN.4/L.702 (18 July 2006) legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_l702.pdf.
150. Ibid, VCLT (n 111) art 31(3)(c).
151. Brölmann (n 110).
152. Danchin and others (n 22).
153. Lisbeth Zimmermann, Nicole Deitelhoff, Max Lesch, Antonio Arcudi and Anton Peez, International Norm Disputes: The Link between Contestation and Norm Robustness (Oxford University Press 2023).
154. Danchin and others (n 22).
155. Brölmann (n 110).
156. Ibid.
157. Christian Bellak and Markus Leibrecht, ‘The (Political) Economics of Bilateral Investment Treaties – The Unique Trajectory of Brazil’ (2024) 12(6) Economies 130, 9–11.
158. Shen and Shang (n 82).
159. International Institute for Sustainable Development, ‘Ecuador Denounces Its Remaining 16 BITs’ (12 June 2017), www.iisd.org/itn/2017/06/12/ecuador-denounces-its-remaining-16-bits-and-publishes-caitisa-audit-report/.
160. Occidental Petroleum Corporation and Occidental Exploration and Production Company v Republic of Ecuador (ICSID Case No ARB/06/11, Award, 5 October 2012), investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-dispute-settlement/cases/238/occidental-v-ecuador-ii (awarding USD 1.769 billion to the investor, later partially annulled on 2 November 2015).
161. Kallis (n 30).
162. Eiran, Ish-Shalom and Kornprobst (n 5).
163. Jiang (n 147).
164. Kallis (n 30); Chryssogelos (n 60).
165. Koskenniemi and Leino (n 85).
166. Thomas J Miles and Eric Posner, ‘Which States Enter into Treaties, and Why?’ (John M Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper No 420, 2008).
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